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Has

When

it

Joette

Plentywounds-Yupe

failed t0

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

revoked her probation?

ARGUMENT
Plentywounds-Yupe Has Failed Show That The
A.

District Court

Abused

Its

Discretion

Introduction

A

Witness observed Plentywounds—Yupe drive across double yellow lines and into

oncoming lanes on a divided highway, leave

The Witness contacted law enforcement

the roadway, and “spin[] a cookie.” (PSI, pp.35-37.)

t0 report that

Plentywounds-Yupe was possibly driving

While intoxicated. (PSI, p.3.) Ofﬁcers stopped Plentywounds—Yupe. (PSI, p.3.) During the trafﬁc

stop,

Plentywounds-Yupe told ofﬁcers, “I’m drunk.”

(PSI, p.32.)

She repeatedly called the

ofﬁcers “bitch” and “White bitch” throughout the course of the trafﬁc stop.

Plentywounds-Yupe refused

t0

perform the standardized ﬁeld sobriety

also refused to provide a breath sample.

(R., pp.3, 32.)

alcoholic beverages in Plentywounds-Yupe’s

empty.

(PSI, p.32.)

A

(PSI, p.32.)

(R., pp.3, 32.)

tests.

She

Ofﬁcers discovered more than forty

car—some of the

bottles

and cans were open and

blood draw revealed that Plentywounds-Yupe had an excessive blood

alcohol concentration 0f .227. (PSI, p.3, 57.)

The

State charged

Plentywounds-Yupe With operating a motor vehicle While under the

inﬂuence 0f alcohol, felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6).

(R., pp.52-53.1)

plea agreement, Plentywounds-Yupe pled guilty to felony DUI. (R., pp.60-67.)

imposed a uniﬁed ten-year sentence, With two years ﬁxed.

(R., pp.72-77.)

Pursuant to a

The

district court

The court suspended

her sentence and placed her 0n probation for ten years. (R., pp.72-77.)

on probation, the

In September 2014, less than one year after being placed

motion

for

probation

Violation,

Plentywounds-Yupe admitted
(1) twice

alleging

that she

seven

probation

Violations.

(R.,

state

ﬁled a

pp.81-83.)

had violated the terms and conditions 0f her probation by:

consuming an alcoholic beverage,

(2) failing t0 notify her supervising

ofﬁcer 0f contact

With law enforcement, and (3) operating a motor vehicle in Violation of the court’s order.
pp.82-83,

113.)

The

district

court revoked Plentywounds-Yupe’s probation, executed the

judgment, and retained jurisdiction.

Community Rider.

1

(R.,

(R., pp.113-17.)

The

court

recommended

a Therapeutic

(R., p.1 16.)

Plentywounds-Yupe received a Withheld judgment for her ﬁrst DUI. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Her
second DUI stemmed from an arrest that occurred just four days after her arrest in this case. (PSI,
p5.) That DUI arrest resulted in a judgment of conviction that was entered in August 2013. (PSI,
In 2008,

p.5.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed Plentywounds-Yupe back on
probation for ten years. (R., pp.1 19-24.) In April 20 1 6, approximately one year after being placed

back 0n probation, the
Violations.

state

(R., pp.125-28.)

ﬁled a motion for probation Violation alleging seventeen probation

Plentywounds-Yupe admitted

that she

had violated the terms of her

probation by: (1) committing the crime ofpetit theft, (2) twice committing the crime of intoxicated
person, (3) committing the crime ofpossession of a controlled substance, (4) committing the crime

ofpossession ofdrug paraphernalia, (5) purchasing a motor vehicle without permission; (6) driving
Without a valid driver’s license 0r an interlock device, (7) failing t0 attend or successfully complete
the rider aftercare program, and (8) leaving her assigned district Without ﬁrst obtaining permission

from her supervising ofﬁcer. (TL,
probation.

pp.182-84;

(R.,

p.4, L.11

T11, p.12,

— p.7,

Ls.24-25.)

L.8.)

The court revoked Plentywounds-Yupe’s

Plentywounds-Yupe timely appealed from the

order revoking probation. (R., pp. 1 85-87.)

Standard

B.

Of Review

In reviewing the district court’s decision t0 revoke probation, this Court employs “a two-

step analysis.”

State V. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105,

First, the appellate court

Li.

233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009)

(citation omitted).

determines “whether the defendant violated the terms 0f his probation.”

If the appellate court determines “that the defendant has in fact violated the terms

probation, the second question

The decision

mic,

to

is

What should be the consequences 0f that

revoke probation

is

Violation.” Li.

within the sound discretion of the court.

164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018).

“A

0f his

district court’s

State V.

Le

decision t0 revoke

probation Will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 0f discretion.” San_chez, 149 Idaho at
105, 233 P.3d at 36.

When

a

trial

court’s discretionary decision

is

reviewed on appeal, the

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine Whether the lower court: (1) perceived

the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries 0f such discretion; (3) acted

consistently with any legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices before

its

decision

by an

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

exercise 0f reason.

it;

and

(4)

reached

429 P.3d 149, 158

(2018).

Plentywounds-Yupe Has Shown No Abuse Of The

C.

On appeal, Plentywounds-Yupe

District Court’s Discretion

does not challenge the determination that she violated the

terms of her probation, nor could she given that she admitted the Violations t0 the

(T12, p.4,

by

L.11

—

failing to reach its decision to

brief, p.5.)

The
probation.

Instead, she asserts the district court “abused

p.7, L.8; R., p.179.)

district court.

its

discretion

revoke her probation by the exercise 0f reason.” (Appellant’s

Plentywounds-Yupe’s argument lacks merit.
district court

did not abuse

its

discretion

when

it

revoked Plentywounds-Yupe’s

In reviewing the propriety 0f a probation revocation, the focus 0f the inquiry

conduct underlying the

trial court's

the

decision t0 revoke probation. State V. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,

621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).
Violations of the terms

is

Plentywound’s-Yupe’s admitted t0 seven separate

and conditions 0f her second probation. (TL,

p.4, L.11

—

p.7, L.8.)

Her

probation Violations were not insigniﬁcant, technical Violations. She committed a variety of new

crimes including possession of a controlled substance, possession ofdrug paraphernalia, petit theft,

and intoxicated person. (TL,
rider aftercare treatment,

(T12, p.6,

and

p.5, L.8

left

—

p.6, L.17.)

She also

failed t0 successfully

her assigned district without her probation ofﬁcer’s permission.

Ls.23-25.) A11 0f these Violations occurred within approximately one year of the court

placing Plentywounds-Yupe back on probation following her rider.

Plentywounds-Yupe’s
if it

complete the

wanted

t0

trial

(R., pp.125-29.)

counsel conceded that “the Court certainly would be within

impose sentence given

.

.

.

its

Even
rights

the number, and nature 0fthe Violations.” (T12, p.9, L.25

—

p.10, L.4.)

By

her

own

admission, revocation was wholly appropriate given her conduct on

probation.

Additionally, revocation

is

supported by Plentywounds-Yupe’s history of noncompliance

with the terms 0f her probation. The court placed her on probation twice. And, she violated the

Upon

terms 0f her probation twice.
probation.

conviction, she initially received the beneﬁt of a ten-year

(R., pp.72-77; Tr., p.12, Ls.1-2.)

She quickly violated the terms of that probation by

resuming her consumption 0f alcohol, operating a motor vehicle in Violation of the court’s order,

and

failing t0 notify her supervising

R., pp.82-83, 113.)

ofﬁcer of contact with law enforcement. (TL,

The court was Willing

things could be turned around.”

retained jurisdiction for

up

t0

t0 give

Plentywounds-Yupe the opportunity

(TL, p.12, Ls.15-16).

365 days.

p. 12, Ls. 12-15;

(R., pp.1 13-17.)

placed Plentywounds—Yupe 0n a ten—year probation.

t0 “see if

The court revoked her probation but
Following her

rider, the court

again

(R., pp.1 19-24; Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.)

Yet

again she was quick to Violate the terms 0f her probation, just as she had done before. She failed
t0

complete her rider aftercare program, choosing instead to consume alcohol, possess drugs and

drug paraphernalia, and drive Without a license or an ignition interlock device. (TL, p.5, L.16 —
p.6,

L25;

ﬂ

R., pp.125-28.)

Despite several opportunities t0 prove herself successful on

probation, Plentywounds-Yupe’s conduct has consistently demonstrated her unwillingness

with the terms and conditions 0f her probation. This pattern of behavior

0f a successful probationer, and supports the
Thus, because of her conduct, the
probation.

district court’s

district court

did not abuse

is

comply

inconsistent With that

decision to revoke her probation.

its

discretion

When

it

revoked her

On

appeal,

Plentywounds-Yupe argues “her probation Violations did not justify revoking

probation” in light of her abusive marriage, her familial support, and her need for additional
treatment. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) She

The

district court

is

incorrect.

properly considered mitigating factors—such as Plentywounds-Yupe’s

abusive marriage and her familial support—and yet
court

was aware of the mitigating

factors

still

properly revoked her probation. The

Plentywounds-Yupe

relies

on

in her appeal.

During the

disposition hearing, her trial counsel alerted the court to the fact that the PSI suggested she

associating with her eX-husband and discussed the abuse she

Ls.13-17.)

The PSI

consideration.

had suffered

also contained signiﬁcant family information

at his

comments

trial

hand.

was

(T12, p.9,

for the court’s

(PSI, p.170.) Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, the district court rejected

Plentywounds-Yupe’s request for a second period of retained

jurisdiction.

The mere

fact that

Plentywounds-Yupe has familial support and was the Victim of an abusive marriage does not show
an abuse 0f the court’s discretion, especially in

light

of the nature 0f her probation Violations and

her long history 0f non-compliance With the terms of her probation.

Finally,

Plentywounds-Yupe’s assertion

jurisdiction” because she

programing”

is

belied

by

had “demonstrated

the record.

that she “should

that she

would apply herself

is

App. 1995).

and

achieving “the objective of rehabilitation

while also providing adequate protection for society.” State

(Ct.

to treatment

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) In determining Whether to revoke

probation a court must consider Whether probation

P.2d 984, 985

have been sentenced to a retained

V.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899

If the court reasonably concludes

m

from the defendant’s conduct

that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, then probation

may be

Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454-55, 566 P.2d

The record supports

1110, 1112-13 (1977).

revoked.

the

conclusion that probation was neither achieving the objective of rehabilitation nor providing

adequate protection for society.
Despite an obvious need for treatment, Plentywounds-Yupe failed to successfully avail
herself of several rehabilitative opportunities that were afforded t0 her.

ﬁrst probation

by consuming

alcohol, twice.

She quickly violated her

(R., pp.82-83, 113-17.)

placed 0n a rider and then back on probation.

(R., pp.113-17.)

Consequently, she was

Nevertheless, on her second

probation she failed t0 successfully complete her rider aftercare program.

She committed the new crime 0f intoxicated person, twice.

(TL, p.6, Ls.23-25.)

(Tn, p.5, Ls.16-25.)

She also

possessed a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. (TL, p.6, Ls.4-17.) She also purchased
a car and drove

risk.

it

without a license 0r an equipped interlock device, thereby putting the public

(TL, p.6, Ls.18—22.) This conduct supports the conclusion that probation

the goal of rehabilitation and

was

at

was not achieving

inconsistent With the protection of society.

Because

Plentywounds-Yupe’s probation was not achieving the goal of rehabilitation and was inconsistent
With the protection 0f society, the revocation of her probation was not an abuse of discretion. She
has failed to establish otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the order 0f the

18th day of December, 2019.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

district court.
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